گفتگوی روزنامه ایران دیلی با دکتر علیرضا ملائی توانی درخصوص رخداد ۲۸ مرداد ۱۳۳۲ش.

After the Second World War, the United States entered into the world equations more and more. But it was trying to enter global relations with a democratic and pro-democracy image. What factors forced the U.S. government to take part in the 1953 coup d’état against the national government of Iran?

There are three important factors to consider. First is the U.S. government’s inability to peacefully resolve the dispute over Iran’s oil between Iran and Britain. Neither the British were willing to give minimal concessions to Iran in order to achieve a win-win understanding, nor was Mossadeq’s national government willing to fall short of nationalizing Iran’s oil industry. The main conflict was over the essence of the legislation that nationalized Iran’s oil industry, which Mossadeq’s government incessantly tried to protect despite Britain’s absolute disapproval.

Therefore, negotiations and consultations of different ambassadors and representatives on behalf of the U.S. government, the World Bank, etc. for the purpose of mediation could not solve the problem. Although the U.S. government tried to play a patronizing role in the negotiations between Iran and England, in the end, it entered the conflict as a superior power and resolved the issue non-peacefully through a coup. Therefore, the democratic aspect that the U.S. tried to project as an emerging power was more of a political tool. The interests of the United States were more important than any kind of democratic movement in the world.

The second factor was Iran’s strategic importance and its close geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, which had become extremely important in the international relations of the time. The first conflict between the great powers during the Cold War occurred in the evacuation of the Allies from Iran, as the Soviets had occupied parts of northern Iran and the British had occupied southern Iran.

While the British left the southern provinces of Iran, the Russians were not willing to leave the soil of Iran at that time. Soon after, the Russians founded the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran’s provinces of East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan, which was a form of secessionism. This was the preliminary stage of the Cold War. The U.S. government felt that if it does not resolve the dispute between Iran and Britain over the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, the Tudeh Party may gain power in Iran and reignite the previous conflict with the Soviet Union. For this reason or on the same pretext, the U.S. entered the coup d’état so that by being present in Iran, it will have a strong base next to the Soviet Union and benefit from Iran’s lasting oil reserves, as well.

So, the third factor for the United States’ intervention in the coup was to gain access to Iran’s oil. In the end, the U.S. reaped the biggest reward, too. That is to say, after the fall of Iran’s national government and the return of the Shah, the U.S. got the largest share in the oil consortium and became the star player in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. The U.S. effectively supported an autocratic king which later joined the Western bloc and established a strong base just outside the Soviet Union’s border.

At that time and in the midst of the traditional rivalry between Britain and Russia in Iran, many Iranians hoped that the proximity to the United States would be a way to eliminate the interference of the two traditional powers in Iran. Do you consider the hope to be unfounded?

This hope arose in Iran based on an understanding of the evolving relations of the world system after World War II. Many Iranian reformers and elites during the Qajar era were inclined toward a third force to break the hegemony of Britain and Russia in Iran. At times, the inclination was aimed at the U.S. Later, it was aimed at some European powers, and eventually at Germany during the First World War since it had gained a lot of power. It was concluded that perhaps the notion of ​​a third force could be used to reduce the pressure of the colonial powers. The supporters of the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry notably had such hope. But in practice, what was displayed was the essence of the U.S. power, despite the hope or analysis of some Iranians.

Almost 70 years have passed since the August 28 coup. Why has this historical-political event not been erased from the minds of Iranians?

I believe that the impression of the August 28 coup on the mindset of Iranians was so dark and eerie that it cannot be erased easily. That ominous memory cast such a great shadow on the relations between the two countries that it has changed the life of Iranians in the past few decades. In my opinion, the coup’s effect was manifold, one of which was the return of tyranny to Iran and the loss of the great heritage of the Constitutional Revolution and the freedom movement of Iranians. The coup put the country on the path of being a dependent authoritarian government and exposed Iran’s intellectuals, freedom seekers, and civil activists to much damage.

Simultaneously with the growth of Westernism in the government after the coup, the movement and discourse that rejected Westernism grew rapidly in Iran. In the bipolar atmosphere of the post-World War II era, many Iranian intellectuals and elites joined the left-wing movements and defined Marxism as a model to get rid of the colonial ties formed by the West.

All in all, a harsh anti-Western atmosphere was created in Iran, which incidentally prevented the West from understanding Iran accurately. After the bitter experience of the failure of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the subsequent occupation of Iran in August 1941, the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, which was tied to bringing British colonialism to its knees, was sweet for Iranians. But the U.S. and British governments soured this sweet experience with a coup.

Naturally, the obvious interference from the US was so bitter and upsetting that its effects rippled all the way to the Islamic Revolution, Iranians’ opposition to the West, and the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. It created an atmosphere of hostility in the relations between the two countries that cannot be easily resolved.

In my opinion, this is a unique phenomenon in international relations that requires an apology, compensation, and clarification on the part of the U.S. Some sense of reasonableness is necessary to see both parties healed to some extent and recovered from that bitter experience. Such an atmosphere of reason has not been created yet, and the United States’ measures have increasingly fueled the mistrust. On the other hand, considering that the discourse of rejecting colonialism and Westernism is now prevailing inside the Islamic Republic, reaching an agreement has become very, very difficult.

Have the Americans done enough to remove this historical bitterness from the mindset of Iranians?

I think the Americans have made some efforts. For example, they have always claimed that we forced the Soviet Union to evacuate Iran and save Azerbaijan by giving an ultimatum to Stalin, going so far as saying that Azerbaijan is the United States’ gift to the Iranian nation. Many works and ads have been published promoting this idea including Mark Gasiorowski who offered a specific American narrative on this issue.

But later, former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright admitted to the involvement of the U.S. in the coup. So, some attempts have been made, but not enough to call it a coherent and purposeful move to win the trust of Iranians. Currently, the mistrust between the two countries, especially considering the policy of the incumbent Iranian government, is too deep for reaching an understanding.

After the victory of the Revolution, Iran and the U.S. tried to resolve or reduce the disputes. If signed, can the nuclear agreement be a catalyst or a facilitator to move toward resolving the disputes, or do you think that the disputes have roots beyond political issues and cannot be resolved?

I speculate that if the nuclear deal is concluded satisfactorily, the parties will maintain an understanding that, for example, American companies will be able to enter Iran and invest with the permission of the Iranian government. Moreover, the relations between the two countries will develop, and many restrictions and sanctions will be lifted. Iran will be able to benefit from the benefits of large-scale international investments and, at the same time, maintain its independent sovereignty. Then, maybe it will be possible to transition past the stage of hostilities. But the disputes between Iran and the United States are much more complicated than the nuclear negotiations. There are issues pertaining to Israel and the region, as well as a lot of insoluble problems on which reaching an understanding seems very, very difficult at the moment. So, removing the effects of the coup may not be so easy.

The 1953 coup led to the overthrow of the national government in Iran, a government that may not have been quite acceptable and legitimate from the perspective of the discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the coup per se was so bitter that the Islamic Republic has not been able to digest it either. For this reason, it seems that there are many complexities and deadlocks that cannot be resolved all at once.

During the presidency of the former Iranian president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, which was concurrent with Bill Clinton’s government in the U.S., promoting the idea of ​​“Dialogue Among Civilizations” by the Iranian government and Madeleine Albright’s admission of involvement in the coup was a step in the right direction. If they had continued in the same direction, then maybe many deadlocks would have been resolved by now.

The road ahead is difficult, but nothing is impossible in the world of politics. Nations have eternal interests, while there are no permanent allies and enemies. I hope that everything will move in a direction where the possibility of a good understanding will emerge, and our country will be spared from the pressures of the U.S. and can benefit from the nuclear agreement.